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rax Legislation and

Since 1953, Congress has enacted at least forty-eight retroactive
amendments to the revenue laws,1 thirty-nine of which have provided
for substantive remedial change.2 While nine of these thirty-nine
amendments have contained specific provisions for extending the
limitations period, 3 sixteen have retroactively amended substantive
law applicable to years normally barred by the statute of limitations
but have not contained a provision extending the limitations period.~
The question is thus raised whether a provision, silent as to its procedural effect, implicitly repeals or modifies the applicable statute of
limitations on claims for refunds brought under the retroactive
change in the law.
Because of the number of retroactive amendments which do not
specifically provide for a change in the limitations period and because
many taxpayers have been affected by these amendments, the problem of construing their procedural effect has been a recurring one.
This interpretative problem resulted in conflicting decisions in the
federal courts. In Tobin v. United States, 5 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that a retroactive remedial amendment6 was
simply a codification of the existing law and, therefore, taxpayer's
refund claim was barred by the statute of limitations even though
I. Brief for Petitioner, p. 15, United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963).
2. The nine that made no change in substantive law extended, for varying periods
up to a year from date of enactment, the time for filing a claim or suit for refund,
e.g., Technical Changes Act of 1953, ch. 512, § 211, 67 Stat. 625; Act of August 1, 1956,
ch. 857, 70 Stat. 917; Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1657, 26 U.S.C. §
20ll(c); Technical Amendments Act of 1958, §§ 96, 98, 72 Stat. 1672, 1673. See also
note 39 infra.
3. Revenue Act of 1962, §§ 26-27, 76 Stat. 1067; Act of September 14, 1960, § 5,
74 Stat. 1013; Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1611, 26 U.S.C. § 172;
Technical Amendments Act of 1958, §§ 92, 93, 100, 72 Stat. 1667, 1668, 1673; Technical
Changes Act of 1953, ch. 512, § 207, 67 Stat. 623, all extending the period for filing refund claims for 6 months or 1 year after date of enactment. See also note 40 infra.
Act of February 15, 1956, ch. 36, 70 Stat. 15, provided for a 7-year limitations extension. Cf. note 67 infra and accompanying text.
4. Revenue Act of 1962, § 30, 76 Stat. 1069; Act of June 27, 1961, §§ 1, 4, 75 Stat. 120;
Act of September 14, 1960, § 5, 74 Stat. 1019; Technical Amendments Act of 1958,
§ 103, 72 Stat. 1675; Act of February 11, 1958, 72 Stat. 3; Act of February 11, 1958,
72 Stat. 4; Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 464, § 3, 70 Stat. 404; Act of February 20, 1956,
ch. 66, 70 Stat. 26; Act of February 20, 1956, ch. 63, § 1, 70 Stat. 23; Act of January 28,
1956, 70 Stat. 8, 26 U.S.C. § 37; Act of August 11, 1955, ch. 808, 69 Stat. 693; Act of
August 9, 1955, § 1, 69 Stat. 625; Technical Changes Act of 1953, ch. 512, § 209, 67
Stat. 624; Act of August 7, 1953, ch. 346, § 3, 67 Stat. 471. See also note 12 infra.
Other retroactive amendments provided for taxpayer elections which would deter•
mine tax treatment for certain specific past years.
5. 264 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1959).
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(q), added by ch. 464, § 1, 70 Stat. 404 (1956).
Section 117(q) is set out at note 19 infra.
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the legislation had been enacted after the applicable limitations
period on his refund claim had run.7 The Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Dempster,8 construing the same remedial amendment, also
ruled against the taxpayer, citing Tobin. In both of these cases, the
taxpayers had argued that the remedial amendment created a claim
against the government, thereby taking the suits out of the normally
applicable three-year limitation period and entitling them to the
six-year limitation period which is applicable to general claims
against the govemment9 or, alternatively, that the provision impliedly extended the applicable limitation period for refund claims
grounded upon the retroactive change in the law. On the other hand,
in Hollander v. United States10 and Zacks v. United States, 11 decisions
were rendered in the taxpayers' favor. The Second Circuit, in
Hollander, held that the remedial legislation12 was so obviously for
the benefit of all taxpayers qualifying under its substantive provisions
that it impliedly suspended the normal limitations period.13 Similarly, in Zacks, the Court of Claims found for the taxpayer on the
ground that otherwise most of the claims brought under the retroactive provision14 would have been barred by the applicable threeyear statute of limitations.15
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 322(b), 53 Stat. 91, provides in pertinent part that
allowable claims for refund must be filed within 3 years from the time the retum
was filed or within 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of the periods
expires later; and if no retum is filed, no refund will be allowed unless claim is filed
within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.
8. 265 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 819 (1959) (also dealing with
§ 117(q)). See Tobin v. Tomlinson, 310 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1962); Vaughn v. United
States, 181 F. Supp. 386 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 240l(a) (1958) provides: "Every civil action commenced against
the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after
the right of action first accrues..••" The argument is that retroactive remedial legislation creates a claim against the govemment for taxes paid under the provision prior
to amendment which are in excess of those which would have been owed if the retroactive amendment had been effective at the time the taxes were paid.
10. 248 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1957).
11. 150 Ct. Cl. 814, 280 F.2d 829 (1960), rev'd, United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59
(1963).
12. Revenue Act of 1951, § 607, 65 Stat. 567, a retroactive amendment providing
relief for the estates of certain decedents dying between 1937 and 1939.
13. Hollander v. United States, 248 F.2d 247, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1957). This reasoning
is typically used by courts that have taken the general position that all substantive
retroactive legislation is by its nature remedial, i.e., for the benefit of all taxpayers
who qualify for refund, and have consequently refused to -treat as controlling the
fact that some claims for refund are barred by the statute of limitations on the date
of enactment or shortly thereafter.
14. Note 6 supra.
15. Zacks v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 814, 280 F.2d 829 (1960). See Smith v.
United States, 304 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963) (by implication) (refund of income tax under § 117(q)); Lorenz v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl.
751! 296 F.2d 746 (1961) (refund of income tax under § 117(q)); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 256, 292·F.2d 901 (1961) (refund of excise taxes); Verckler v.
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In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed the Court of
Claims decision in Zacks and examined at length the reasoning
underlying the conflicting decisions of the lower federal courts. 16 In
Zacks, taxpayer had received royalties of about thirty-seven thousand
dollars in 1952 on patents, all substantial rights to which had been
transferred to a manufacturing corporation. As required by the then
prevailing administrative position, the royalties were reported as
ordinary income17 in the 1952 joint federal income tax return filed
by taxpayer and her husband. Because the last payment of this tax
was made in 1953, the statute of limitations would normally have
barred any claims for refund concerning the year in question that
were asserted after 1956.18 In 1958, taxpayer filed a claim for a pro
tanto refund of the 1952 tax under section 117(q) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939.19 This section of the Code was added in 1956
to provide for retroactive relief by allowing long-term capital gains
treatment of amounts received in any taxable year beginning after
May 31, 1950, for the transfer of qualifying patent rights, regardless
of the year in which the transfer occurred. The Commissioner took
no action on the claim, so taxpayer brought a refund suit in the
Court of Claims. After granting taxpayer's motion to strike the
United States' asserted defense that the claim was barred by the
statute of limitations,20 the Court of Claims entered judgment on the
United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 252, 170 F. Supp. 802 (1959) (refund of estate tax), all holding that the applicable retroactive relief statute gave rise to a constructive "payment"
of the tax upon the date of enactment and that the normal limitations period would
begin to run from the time of this constructive payment. Cf. note 7 supra.
16. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963).
17. Although during this period court decisions distinguished between "amateur"
and "professional" inventors with regard to tax treatment of royalties received for
patent transfers, it would appear that the taxpayer was a "professional" inventor
and, under the then prevailing administrative position and case law, had properly
reported the royalties as ordinary income. See note 29 infra.
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 322(b), 53 Stat. 91. See note 7 supra.
19. Ch. 464, § I, 70 Stat. 404 (1956). Section 117(q) provides:
"(q) TRANSFER OF PATENT RIGHTS-"(!) General Rule.-A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of
property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided interest
therein which includes a part of all such rights, by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months,
regardless of whether or not payments in consideration of such transfer are" (A) payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the
transferee's use of the patent, or
"(B) contingent on the productivity, use or disposition of the property
transferred.
(4) Applicability.-This subsection shall apply with respect to any amount received, or payment made, pursuant to a transfer described in paragraph (I) in
any taxable year beginning after May 31, 1950, regardless of the taxable year in
which such transfer occurred."
• ~O. This ~efense. was based o~ INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 7422(a) which, by proVI<i!ng that no suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court • • • until a
clarm for refund or credit has been duly filed . . . , according to the provisions of
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merits for taxpayer.21 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed,22
holding that Congress, in enacting section 117(q), intended only to
terminate litigation then pending and taxpayer's claim for refund
was barred by limitations. The result of this decision is that only four
groups of taxpayers are entitled to the remedial benefits of section
117(q): 23 (1) those who filed no returns at all for the years involved;
(2) those who filed returns, but failed to pay their taxes; (3) those
who filed returns contrary to law (if they were in a "trade or business"2¼) or contrary to the prevailing treasury viewpoint (if they were
"non-professional" patent-holders25); and (4) those whose returns remained open by implied or express agreement, such as waiver or
extension. The great majority of taxpayers who would otherwise
qualify for the remedial benefits of this substantive retroactive
amendment are, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations because they have not kept these tax years open.
There is no language in section 117(q) that specifically provides
for the application of the statute of limitations to refund claims already barred when it was enacted into law. 26 Moreover, the administrative and legislative backgrounds of section 117(q) also are silent as
to the effect of this section on the statute of limitations.27 However,
the Supreme Court did not draw conclusive presumptions from
this lack of legislative and administrative comment or the failure
to provide for a specific limitations period, but rather, the Court
first examined the purpose behind the enactment. In 1946, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue announced his acquiescence in
Edward C. Myers, 28 a Tax Court case which held that, as to an "amalaw in that regard," arguably incorporated the limitation period of § 322{b) of the
1939 Code for the filing of refund claims under § 117(q).
21. Zacks v. United States, 150 Ct. CI. 814, 280 F.2d 829 (1960). The Government
argued that § 117(q) was enacted only to terminate then pending litigation, i.e., claims
not barred on the date of its enactment. But the court held that the amendment
was not so limited in purpose on its face and to hold taxpayer barred by limitations
would be to attribute an "idle gesture" to Congress since the act applies to years
as far back as 1950. 280 F.2d at 831. The parties stipulated the remaining issues,
with the Government reserving the right to appeal the overruling of its motion.
22. Mr. Justice Black dissented, agreeing with the court below, and Mr. Justice
Douglas did not participate in the decision.
23. These four groups of taxpayers are able to use § 117(q) because, through the
various methods mentioned in the text, they have managed to keep open tax years
that would otherwise be closed by the statute of limitations. Cf. United States v.
Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). "[T]he amending provisions of § 117(q) are fully effective
with respect to years and claims not barred." Id. at 70. See generally Walter, Tax
Refund Problems for Patent Owners, 40 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 674, 676 (1958).
24. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
25. See text accompanying note 31 infra.
26. See note 19 supra.
27. See S. REP. No. 1941, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4.5 (1956); H.R. REP. No. 1607, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1956).
28. 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
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teur" inventor,29 the transfer by exclusive license of all substantial
rights under a patent was a sale or exchange of a capital asset and
could be treated as capital gain, even though consideration for the
license took the form of conditional royalties based on a percentage
of the sale and was to be paid annually. 30 However, the Commissioner
withdrew this acquiescence in 1950, declaring that after May 31,
1950, royalties measured or paid in installments as in Myers would
be taxed as ordinary income.31 The Commissioner adhered to this
position, despite its subsequent rejection by several courts.32 While
the enactment of the 1954 Code prospectively settled the issue in
favor of the taxpayer by declaring such income to be a capital gain,88
in 1955 the Commissioner issued a further ruling declaring that he
would adhere to his 1950 position for those tax years beginning after
May 31, 1950, when his acquiescence in the Myers decision was withdrawn, and prior to the enactment of section 1235 in 1954.34 Thus,
the Commissioner's position covering this period was inconsistent
with the application of the law as judicially and administratively
enunciated by the Myers case and the Commissioner's acquiescence
in 1946. The enactment of section 117 (q) was intended to cure this
inconsistency35 by providing relief, retroactive to 1950, which was
similar to that prospectively established in the 1954 Code. However,
this history, by itself, does not reveal whether Congress intended to
provide relief for everyone who, between 1950 and 1954, followed
the Commissioner rather than the Myers decision, or just for the taxpayers who kept those tax years open through one of the devices
mentioned earlier.36
29. An amateur inventor is one not engaged in holding patent rights primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, as distinguished
from a professional inventor who is so engaged. Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258, 266
(1946).
30. 1946-1 CuM. BuLL. 3. Prior to 1946 several courts had taken this position, e.g.,
Comm'r v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Comm'r v. Hopkinson, 126
F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942).
31. Mimeo 6490, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 9.
32. E.g., Allen v. Werner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1951); Kronner v. United States,
150 Ct. Cl. 817, 110 F. Supp. 730 (1953). Contra, Bloch v. United States, 200 F.2d 63
(2d Cir. 1952).
33. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1235.
34. Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 97.
35. See note 27 supra.
36. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text. A statement on the floor of the
House by Representative Cooper, then Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, indicated that "as a result of •.• the announced policy of the Internal
Revenue Service to continue its insistence on its position ••• taxpayers are still confronted with litigation for taxable years falling in this period in order to secure the
rights to which the courts, with practical unanimity, have held they are entitled."
101 C?NG. REc. 12708-09 (1956): This statement appears to be the only reference in
the history of § 117(q) concemmg the purpose of the amendment insofar as it was
intended to terminate litigation rather than to provide relief for all taxpayers who
had reported qualifying royalties as ordinary income.

December 1964]

Notes

395

The Supreme Court also considered the fact that Congress
frequently has provided for lifting the normal limitations bar in
substantive retroactive remedial tax legislation,37 specifically referring
to section 14 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958,38 the Act
of August 9, 1955,39 and section 2 of the Act of June 29, 1956.40 The
last of these is another provision of the same act which was in dispute
in the Zacks case. It went to the Conference Committee, along with
the section ll7(q) amendment, without reference to the applicable
statute of limitations and was there amended to provide for a special
limitations period.41 The Court considered this "striking evidence
... all but conclusive" that, had Congress intended to affect the
limitations period governing section ll7(q), it would have expressly
done so.42
In Zacks, the taxpayer argued that section ll7(q) was intended
to establish two other rights in addition to overturning the Commissioner's inconsistent position for the years 1950 through 1954 and
a refusal to grant an exemption from the existing statute of limitations to claims based upon those rights would render them nugatory.
The basis of taxpayer's contention was that section ll7(q) retroactively gave so-called "professional" inventors, for the first time, 43
the right to treat qualifying patent royalties as long-term capital
gain. 44 In addition, the provision eliminated any necessary holding
period to qualify for this treatment. 45 In construing the statute, the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not intend to establish
these two retroactive rights; rather, the broad scope of section 117 (q)
resulted because Congress merely iterated the language used in
section 1235 of the 1954 Code.46 Thus, the Court held that the sole
37. See note '!, supra.
38. 72 Stat. 1611, 26 U.S.C. §§ 172(£)(3)•(4), (g){3) (1958). This provided a 6-month
limitations period during which otherwise barred claims could be asserted under new
rules for computing net operating loss deductions promulgated in the same act. The
limitations provision was added to the House bill by the Senate. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1958).
39. 67 Stat. 607 (1953). This act provided a I-year limitation period for filing
otherwise barred claims based on § 345 of the Revenue Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 517, a
substantive retroactive relief measure. See note 2 supra. The limitation period was
enacted to correct legislative "oversight." H.R. REP. No. 1438, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1955).
40. Ch. 464, 70 Stat. 404 (1956), relating to taxation of certain payments received
prior to 1950 from the United States for construction of Armed Forces facilities, expressly provides for a I-year special limitations provision.
41. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 67 (1963).
42. Ibid.
43. When patents had been held for sale in the ordinary course of trade or business,
the Commissioner's position had remained constant that they were not capital assets
as defined by !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221 and that consideration for their sale or
exchange constituted ordinary income.
44. See notes 17, 19 supra.
45. See note 19 supra.
46. H.R. REP. No. 1607, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1·2 (1956).

396

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 63

function of section 117(q) was to overturn the Commissioner's position; it felt this was indicated not only by the affirmative evidence
revealed in the administrative and legislative history (including the
selection of May 31, 1950, as the operative date of the act47), but
also by the lack of any evidence to indicate that Congress intended
other than to settle the large volume of pending litigation that arose
because of the Commissioner's inconsistent ruling. 48
Arguably, Supreme Court precedent relating to general principles
of statutory construction might have required an opposite result:
remedial provisions should be liberally construed to give the relief
intended; 49 specific legislation should prevail over general; 50 subsequent legislation should prevail over earlier statutes; 51 and statutes
are to be construed so as to give effect to all provisions when possible.52
The Court brushed aside the first three of these rules on the ground
that they were inapplicable to a statute of such "evident" limited
purpose. As to the fourth, the Court stated that it was a "general
principle . . . meant to guide courts in furthering the intent of the
legislature, not in overriding it. When rigid adherence to the general
rule would require disregard of clear indications to the contrary,
the rule must yield." 53
Furthermore, the Court rejected taxpayer's argument that a
decision subjecting claims that arise from section 117(q) to the
normal statute of limitations would place a premium on taxpayer
opposition to administrative rulings in order to keep old tax years
open. The Court, while admitting the force of this argument in some
contexts, declared that the argument was severely limited in this
setting because most courts were willing to reverse the Commissioner
even before passage of section 117(q) and because "acceptance of the
taxpayer's argument would lead to automatic waiver of the statute
47. "The date selected has no relevance either to the status of professional inventors
or to the period for which patent rights must be held." United States v. Zacks, 375
U.S. 59, 69 (1963). See text accompanying note 31 supra.
48. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 69 (1963). The existence of a substantial
amount of such litigation was not an issue in the case. Id. at 69 n.10. A good deal
of such litigation was pending when § 117(q) was enacted, part of which was subse•
quently settled by payment of full refund, e.g., Goff v. United States, No. 252-56,
Ct. Cl.; Ozai-Durrani v. United States, No. 125-37, Ct. CI.; A. M. Junt v. United
States, No. 33687, N.D. Ohio; Hassler v. United States, No. 7359, N.D. Cal.; Schlenz v.
United States, No. 57-C-264, N.D. Ill., or by dismissal of governmental appeals, e.g.,
Beeth v. United States, No. 8399, S.D. Tex.; Comm'r v. Hudson, No. 58726, T.C.;
King v. United States, No. 8316, S.D. Tex.; Waterson v. United States, No. 308, N.D.
Tex.
49. Bonwit Teller v. United States, 283 U.S. 258, 263 (1931).
50. Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 76 (1936). Cf. 2 SUTIIERLAND, STATUTORY CON•
STRUCTION § 5204 (2d ed. 1943).
51. Oates v. First Nat'! Bank, 100 U.S. 239, 244 (1879). Cf. 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit.
supra note 50, § 5201 n.8.
52. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); Markham v. Cabell,
326 U.S. 404, 411 (1945).
53. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 69 (1963) (Emphasis added).
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of limitations in every case. Whether or not this should be done is a
matter for Congress to decide." 54
United States v. Zacks indicates that congressional failure to
provide for a special limitations period in substantive retroactive
remedial tax legislation does not automatically create an exemption
from the applicable statute of limitations for refund claims based
on that legislation; on the other hand, such failure does not, of itself,
indicate that the normally applicable limitations period is always
to apply since, in two particulars, the Court attempted to limit its
decision to the facts. First, the Court stated generally that congressional failure to provide expressly for a special limitations period
does not raise the presumption that the relevant statute of limitations
is to apply, but rather each case is to be judged ad hoc "as with all
questions of statutory construction." 55 Second, the Court indicated
that there may be some efficacy in the argument that Congress
intends an implied repealer whenever the retroactive legislation
creates a "new" right, as opposed to codifying a pre-existing right.
In this regard, taxpayer had maintained that she was a "professional"
inventor and section 117(q) thereby created a new right for her. 56
She claimed that, prior to the enactment of section 117(q), there
existed no right which she could have allowed to lapse, and consequently, in all equity, the statute of limitations should not now bar
her from asserting rights created for the first time by that section.57
However, the Supreme Court said the distinction between creation
of new rights and clarification of existing rights was not controlling
under the facts in Zacks because Congress had evidenced its intent
too directly to require resort to other interpretative devices.58 Thus,
it may be that in other contexts this argument would provide sufficient indication of congressional intent to convince the courts that
they should recognize an implied exemption from the existing limitations period. This would appear to be especially true when there are
not present reasons for avoiding implied waiver as plausible as those
evidenced in Zacks.
Nevertheless, several additional considerations appear to place a
heavy burden upon any barred taxpayer who attempts to take advantage of substantive retroactive legislation containing no provision
for opening barred years. No presumption is created in favor of the
54. Id. at 70.
55. Id. at 66 n.8.
56. Cf. note 44 supra and accompanying text.
57. Brief for Respondent, passim, United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). This
argument is, of course, inconsistent with the position that the taxpayer had been
prejudiced by reliance on the Commissioner's ruling. Id. at 9. Cf. text accompanying
note 54 supra.
58. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 68 n.9 (1963). The Court of Claims made
no finding as to whether taxpayer was an amateur or professional inventor. Ibid.
But cf. Lorenz v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 751, 296 F.2d 746 (1961).
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taxpayer, even though the legislation is intended to be remedial. The
intent of Congress is to control,59 and Congress has repeatedly demonstrated that it is aware of the limitations problem in this context and
is capable of lifting the bar when it deems it necessary to effectuate
the. purposes of the amendment. 60 In addition, Congress itself has,
upon occasion, corrected the inadvertent omission of an additional
limitations period in a remedial retroactive statute by enacting supplementary legislation.61 Furthermore, allowing retroactive legislation that is silent as to its procedural effect to extend claims already
barred could create an anomalous situation where an additional grace
period included in the amendment could actually operate to shorten
the time that would otherwise be available for claiming a refund.
Such a situation would arise whenever an amendment included a special limitations provision providing for a shorter period for claiming
refunds than would otherwise have been implied had the statute not
expressly incorporated a limitations period. Thus, taxpayers for
whom Congress makes no provision for extending the statute of
limitations may be treated more favorably than those for whom provision is expressly made. While such a result is not entirely implausible, it is patently inconsistent with the Supreme Court's stated position that Congress and not the courts should determine limitation
periods. 62 Finally, congressional silence in this area does not invite
judicial gap-filling, since finding an implied waiver of the statute of
limitations may well raise more problems than the retroactive enactment itself was intended to solve. If the legislation is held impliedly
to repeal the usual limitations period, what period of limitations
should apply: the six-year limitations period governing claims against
the government, 63 the two-year period allowed for constructive "payment" of tax, 64 the three-year maximum allowed under section 322(b)
after filing the return, 65 or even the six-month or one-year grace
period customarily granted by Congress when it expressly reopens
barred years? 66 There would also be the question of whether the new
period applied to all claims covered by the substantive terms of the
retroactive amendment or only to those claims and tax years barred
as of the date of enactment.
Of the above factors, only the first-congressional intent as evidenced by frequent enactment of retroactive tax amendments that
specifically provide for a special limitations period-was expressly
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See text accompanying note 54 supra.
Notes 3, 38, 39, 40 supra.
See, e.g., note 39 supra.
See text accompanying note 54 supra.
28 U.S.C. § 240l(a) (1958).
INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 65ll(a); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 322(b), 53 Stat. 91.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 322(b), 53 Stat. 91.
See note 3 supra.
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considered in United States v. Zacks. However, by holding that the
existing indications of congressional intent dictated the decision,
courts in the future will be initially, if not entirely, constrained from
finding an implied repeal of existing statutes of limitations simply
from the fact that Congress in the past has expressly provided for extending limitations periods. Moreover, if Congress mentions and
rejects in committee a special limitations provision, the courts will
certainly recognize the rejection as proscribing an implied exemption
from the normally applicable limitations period. Alternatively, congressional failure to mention a provision extending the limitations
period, coupled with the frequently unique reasons for retroactive
legislation,67 would seem to provide clear enough indication of congressional purpose to override both traditional rules of statutory
construction and the apparent equities of taxpayer's refund claim.
67. For explications to the effect that much, if not most, remedial tax legislation
is enacted for the benefit of a single taxpayer or a small group of taxpayers, see Cary,
Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing
Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARv. L. REY. 745 (1955); Surrey, The Congress and
the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARv. L. REY. 1145
(1957). Under this view, Hollander v. United States, 248 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1957), could
have easily been decided for the Government, since the remedial legislation there in
question was enacted for the benefit of a single taxpayer, who had a timely refund
claim filed on the date of enactment. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 8, 9, Rice v. Broderick,
Civil No. 632 (D.R.I. 1952). Apparently the Second Circuit was not made aware of
these facts. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 37-39, United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963).

